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that acknowledgment by the testator of his signature will be a suf-
ficient compliance with the statute and will be the equivalent of
"acknowledgment of the will," although the statute states that the will
must be acknowledged and in spite of the fact that a number of cases
also state that the -will, and not the signature, is the subject of
acknowledgment. Kentucky Revised Statutes sec. 394.040, dealing
with proof of a will when witnesses thereto are unavailable, indicates
that the purpose of the statute is fulfilled when a testator's signature
on a will is proved to be genuine and seems to suggest that appearance
of a testator's genuine signature on a will indicates that the instrument
was intended to be his will.
As a practical matter, when a will is published or acknowledged
as the testator's will, his signature must almost always by subscribed
thereon at that time, although in some cases a liberal presumption
operates in favor of the conclusion that the testators signature was
already on the will at the time it was acknowledged. Of course, if
the testator acknowledges his will to the witnesses and then signs in
their presence this problem concerning the testator's signature is
unimportant. The lib~ral presumption in favor of the prior signing
of the testator in cases where his signature on a will is proved to be
genuine is believed to be sound. Proof of one's genuine signature on
a will is a good indication that the testator intended that the will
should take effect as such.
It is submitted that the meaning of "acknowledgment of a will"
should be clarified in future Kentucky cases. The Court of Appeals
should clearly state that "acknowledgment of a will" does not mean
that a testator must inform witnesses that the instrument in question
is his will (publish the will), but merely that he must indicate to them
that it is his act and deed. The mere request to sign or witness an
instrument, the identity of which is unknown to the witnesses, should
be sufficient.
P. JoAN SKAGGs
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KENTUCKY WATER LAW
The 1954 Kentucky General Assembly substantially clarified the
rights of landowners to use the water resources on and contiguous to
their land by the enactment of sections 262.670 through 262.690 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes.1 The legislature did not intend these
" For a complete analysis of sections 2962.670 through 262.690 of the Ky. REv.
STAT., see 44 Ky. L. J. 407 (1955).
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new statutory sections to be a complete codification of water rights
law stating all the provisions governing the use of water, but they are
the adequate beginning of a comprehensive water code which could
eventually cover all water problems in the Commonwealth. The pur-
pose of this note is to make a comparative analysis of recent similar
statutory provisions adopted by Kentucky's sister state, Virginia. The
analysis includes a general, section-by-section comparison between the
Kentucky and Virginia statutes where applicable, but the principal
concern is for those sections affecting a landowner's right to use and
conserve water from riparian streams. Of the states bordering Ken-
tucky, the Virginia statutes seem to offer the most fruitful opportunity
for comparison because of the similarity of water problems in the two
states, and also because statutory changes adopted in Virginia in 1954
are based on a comprehensive study of water problems completed in
1953. It is thought that such a comparison will be helpful in determin-
ing whether any of the Virginia provisions are needed in Kentucky.
The Virginia statute is found under Title 62 of the Code of Virginia,
and it is entitled "Waters of the State, Ports, and Harbors." The first
chapter of the Code, entitled "Water Courses Generally," is primarily
a declaration of principle, based on case law which existed in Virginia
at the time the statute was adopted, that the navigable waters of the
state and the soil under those waters are the property of the state,
and are to be controlled by the state at its discretion.2 The Kentucky
legislature has not found it necessary to give statutory expression to
this principle since the amount of navigable waters within the jurisdic-
tion of the Commonwealth is limited. Kentucky case law, however,
recognizes that the state may exercise plenary control of the navigable
waters within its limits up. to the high watermark.
3
The Virginia sections most important for purposes of comparison
are found in Chapter 1.1 and were enacted in 1954. They state basic
water law policy as to the rights of landowners to water in public
streams or lakes.4 The statute begins by defining the words "water"
' CoDE- OF VA. sec. 62-1 (1919). For a discussion of case law of Virginia
prior to the adoption of the statute, see Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759,
47 S.E. 875 at 879 (1904) where it is said that ".. . the navigable waters and the
soil under them, within the territorial limits of a state, are the property of the
state, to be controlled by the state, in its own discretion, for the benefit of the
people of the state, and demonstrate that ... (sec. 92.1) of the Code is a declara-
tion of right in the state, sanctioned and supported by the common law."
'See Natcher v. Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584 at 588, 95 S.W. 2d 255 at 257,
(1936) saying: "A state may exercise plenary control over the navigable waters
within its limits up to the ordinary highwater mark in the absence of action by
Congress or its agency under the commerce powers of the Federal Constitution.
" CoD' or VA. title 62 Chapter 1.1 provides in full: "Sec. 62-9.1 Definitions-
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and "beneficial uses" in order to give clarity and meaning to these
terms as used in the statute. Water is given a very inclusive definition
by including "any river, stream, creek, branch, lake, pond, impounding
reservoir, bay, roadstead, estuary, inlet, and bodies of surface waters,
natural or artificial, wholly or partially within or bordering the state
or within its jurisdiction, and which affect the public welfare." Bene-
ficial uses means "domestic, agricultural and commercial and industrial
uses."5 Although these definitions are made primarily for the purpose
As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the meanings respectively
ascribed to them:
(a) "Water" includes all waters of any river, stream, creek, branch, lake,
pond, impounding reservoir, bay, roadstead, estuary, inlet, and bodies of
surface waters, natural or artificial, wholly or partially within or border-
ing the state or within its jurisdiction, and which affect the public
welfare.
(b) "Beneficial use" means domestic, agricultural and commercial and in-
dustrial uses.
"Sec. 62-9.2 Declared natural resources; State regulation and conservation;
limitations upon rights to use-
(a) Such waters are a natural resource which should be regulated by the
State.
(b) The regulation, control, development and use of waters for all purposes
beneficial to the public are within the jurisdiction of the State which in
the exercise of its police powers may establish measures to effectuate the
proper and comprehensive utilization and protection of such waters.
(c) The changing wants and needs of the people of the State may require
the water resources of the State to be put to uses beneficial to the public
to the extent of which they are reasonably capable; the waste or unreason-
able use or unreasonable method of the use of water should be prevented;
and the conservation of such water is to be exercised with a view to the
welfare of the people of the State and their interests in the reasonable
and beneficial use thereof.
(d) The public welfare and interest of the people of the State requires the
proper development, wise use, conservation and protection of water re-
sources together with protection of land resources, as affected thereby.
(e) The right to the use of water or to the flow of water in orfrom any
natural stream, lake, or other watercourse in this State is and shall be
limited to such water as may reasonably be required for the beneficial
use of the public to be served; such right shall not extend to the waste
or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of such water.
"See. 62-9.8 Valid uses not affected; chapter not applicable to proceedings
determining rights-Nothing in this chapter shall operate to affect any existing valid
use of such waters or interfere with such uses hereafter acquired, nor shall it be
construed as applying to the determination of rights in any proceeding now pend-
ing or hereafter instituted.
"See. 62-9.4 Construction with reference to rights, etc., of counties, cities,
and towns-Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed as a declaration
of policy of the State to divest any county, city or town of its title or right to any
water or of its powers conferred by law with respect to the disposition thereof;
nor shall anything in this chapter be construed to authorize the impairment of any
contract to which such county, city, or town is a party, or to obligate any county,
city or town to appropriate or expend any funds. The purpose of this chapter is to
recognize the public use to which such water is devoted."
These provisions were recommended by the Virginia Advisory Legislative
Council after a thorough search into the law which existed in the state at that
time. See "Report of the Virginia Legislative Council to the Governor and the
General Assembly." Senate Document No. 17 (1958).
'Supra note 4, sec. 62-9.1 (b).
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of interpreting later sections in the statute, they do result in making
the policy provisions of the statute applicable to all kinds of water.
The nearest equivalent to these sections in the Kentucky legislation is
section 262.680 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which was also
adopted in 1954. The classification "public water" is used and is given
the comparatively narrow definition of "water occuring in any natural
stream, natural lake or other natural water body in the Commonwealth
which may be applied to any useful and beneficial purpose .... 6
The Kentucky legislation expressly declares that "diffused surface
water" flowing over the land and "water left standing in the natural
pools" in the streams after the streams have receded are excluded
from the regulation of the statute.7 The Kentucky legislature, by in-
dicating specifically the waters not to be covered by the legislation,
has defined in this section the scope of the state's regulation of water.
Under this section, the riparian owner knows exactly the water he can
use without coming within the scope of regulation of the subsequent
sections of the statutes.
Section 62-9.2 of Chapter 1.1 recognizes that Virginia has the right
to regulate water as a natural resource under the police power.8 This
section also states that the need and condition of water resources
require that water be conserved and put to the use most reasonable
and beneficial to the welfare of the people.9 Section 262.670 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, while expressing essentially these same
principles, gives in addition a factual background of reasons for the
legislation. It is stated that excessive rainfall at certain seasons and
prolonged droughts at other seasons threatens the economic welfare
of the state. This factual treatment, describing the situation which
exists in Kentucky, helps show the need for regulation under the
police power in order to protect the general welfare.
Within section 62-9.2 of Chapter 1.1, Virginia also recognizes that
the interests and welfare of the people can be best served by providing
adequate protection to both water and land resources.10 Before a
riparian landowner may use the water on his land in the way that he
wishes, he must be sure that the water and land resources affected by
such use are being properly conserved. Nowhere in sections 262.670
through 262.690 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes is there any pro-
vision recognizing that the land resources affected by the use of water
must be considered in the conservation of water.1
6Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 262.680 (1954). Ibid.
'Supra note 4, sec. 62-9.2 (a) and (b). 'Id. at (c). "Id. at (d).
'4 The Kentucky statute, section 262.680, by excluding surface waters from
the regulation of the act has adopted the existing case law, viz., surface waters
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The Virginia and Kentucky legislatures both establish, in their
respective statutes, the same basic theory to govern all riparian owners
in their right of riparian use. The riparian owner's right to use the
water in streams is limited to such water as is reasonably necessary
for the landowner's needs. 12 The Virginia statute states in section
62-9.2 that the landowner is given the right to reasonably use the
water found in any "natural stream, lake or watercourse," and thereby
limits the definition of water in this section to riparian water, although
the term is given a much broader definition in a prior section.' 3 It
should also be noted that this section of the Virginia statutes does not
have any provision expressly giving the landowner the right to use
surface waters and waters left standing in pools in the stream after
the stream has receded, as the Kentucky statutes give in section
262.680.
After stating that a landowner's right to use riparian water is
limited to a reasonable use, the Kentucky statutes further define the
rights of riparian owners, while the Virginia Code merely states the
basic theory to be applied. The Kentucky provisions codify the com-
mon law principle that a landowner has an unlimited right to use
water in a stream for "domestic purposes" without being liable to a
lower riparian owner and defines what the term "domestic purposes"
shall include.14 It is also provided in the Kentucky statutes that a
riparian owner may impound water in a stream for his use while the
water is at an excess, such as during a flood, so the water will be
available when it is needed in time of a later drought. 5 Under the
statute any obstruction which is placed across a stream must have an
outlet allowing a flow of water to be released for the use of a lower
riparian owner.16 These additional declarations of the rights of land-
owners to use water contiguous to their land were placed in the Ken-
tucky law to encourage the proper use of water by clearly stating
what the rights were before the water is actually used. The Virginia
can be used without limitation. Republic Production Co. v. Collins, 41 S.W. 2d
100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140, 40 -Am. Rep. 519
(1881). To allow unlimited use of water left standing in pools in the bed of the
stream after the stream has receded is a significant alteration in the rights of
riparian owners. Prior to the statute this water could only be used to the extent
it did not prejudice the lower owner. Humphries Mexia Co. v. Arsencaux, 116
Tex. 603, 297 S.W. 225 (1927). See also supra note 1.
'Supra note 4, sec. 62-9.2 (e); Ky. Ruv. STAT. see. 262.690 (2) (1954).
"Supra note 4, sec. 62-9.2 (e) (Reasonable use theory); sec. 62-9.1 (a)
(Broad definition of water).
" Ky. Rsv. STAT. 262.690 (1) (1954) provides that domestic purposes shall
include "household purposes, drinking water for livestock, poultry and domestic
animals." See also supra note 1. "Id. at (3). "Ibid.
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statutes, by failing to further define the rights of land-owners to uase
riparian water, do not achieve the clarity of the Kentucky statutes.
Section 62-9.8 of Chapter 1.1 of the Virginia Code provides that no
right to use water acquired under this regulatory statute "shall operate
to affect any existing valid use of such water or interfere with such uses
hereafter acquired. . . ." Although ambiguously expressed, this sec-
tion clearly means that a riparian landowner who has established a
lawful use of water contiguous to his land may therefore continue the
use of that water without being affected by the regulation of the
instant statute, and another person who acquires that pre-existing
use from him shall have the same rights to the water as his grantor
had established. 17 The Kentucky Revised Statutes state that a riparian
owner shall have the right to the use of water which will not "impair
existing uses of the owners heretofore established.-...,,i Thus, in
effect, the legislature in each state declares that existing valid rights
to use water and a continuance thereof shall not be impaired.' 9
The final section of Chapter 1.1 is devoted to protecting the rights
of any county, city, or town. The Code declares that nothing in this
chapter pertaining to the rights of riparian owners shall be construed
to either divest any county, city, or town of its rights in respect to the
disposition of water, or impair any contract to which it is a party, or
obligate it to expend any funds.20 There is no Kentucky statute com-
parable to this section of the Virginia Code. It is probable, however,
that the increasing uses of water will cause the interests of municipali-
ties and farmers who are both using riparian water to conflict, and the
Kentucky legislature should adopt a similar provision in order to aid
further municipal and agricultural development.
The Virginia Code then turns its attention to the problem of pol-
lution which is dealt with in four chapters. Chapter 2 of Title 62 is
devoted to the purpose of the pollution law, the policy of the state
toward pollution, and the establishment of a supervisory body to
1, Supra note 4. The last sentence of section 9.3, which provides that nothing
in this chapter of the Virginia Code shall "be construed as applying to the
determination of rights in any proceeding now pending or hereafter instituted,"
avoids procedural difficulty in any immediate litigation.
Supra note 14 at (2).
"Section 262.690 (2) of the Kentucky Statutes states that the riparian owner
shall have the right to such reasonable use of riparian water as will not "
impair existing uses of other owners heretofore established. It is contended
that the quoted phrase should contain the word "reasonably" just before the word
impair" in order to give the phrase the proper meaning. Otherwise the reason-
able use theory will not be app lied to existing uses, and it was the intention of the
legislature in adopting the reasonable use theory to apply it to all riparian rights.
For treatment of this problem, see supra note 1.
' Supra note 4, sec. 62-9.4.
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oversee the various aspects of the pollution law.21 Chapter 3 deals
with the protection of water which is to be used for the supply of any
city or town, and the supervision of water works by the State Board
of Health.22 In the two other chapters, Chapter 4 and Chapter 4.1, the
Virginia legislature has provided for the establishment of commissions
between its own state and other states in order to supervise and control
the contamination of mutual waters.23 These Virginia laws concerning
pollution are equivalent to Chapter 220 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes, which is entitled "Sanitation Districts and Water Pollution
Control."24 No discussion of the details of these provisions is necessary
to the analysis of the problems of the right of private landowners to
use the water flowing on their land.
The right to utilize the public waters of Virginia for producing
water power is contained in Chapter 5 of the Code.2 5 The purpose of
this chapter is to encourage the utilization of water resources in the
state to the greatest extent.26 Although the Kentucky legislature has
not found it necessary to devote a section to this aspect of water law,
the right to use water in this state to produce water power has been
recognized by statute.
2 7
Chapter 6 of the Virginia Code regulates the building of ob-
structions, such as dams, across a stream.28 The statute provides that a
landowner who wishes to build a dam may submit an application to
the circuit court of the county where the stream across which the
structure will be erected is found, and a group of commissioners will
be appointed by the court to inspect the stream and surrounding land
in order to determine whether or not the privilege to build the dam
should be granted. The Kentucky statutes, which give a landowner
the right to apply for permission to build dams on the stream running
through his land, provide substantially the same procedure as the
Virginia Code does.29 The statutes of both states also declare that no
person acquiring this right shall do anything which will injure any
vested interest existing on the stream at the time that the right is
granted.30 These historical statutes3' were adopted at a time when
the conditions confronting a landowner who wished to construct a
CODE OF VA. sees. 62-10 to 62-42. "Id. at sees. 62-47 to 62-61.
Id. at sees. 62-62 to 62-67 and sees. 62-67.1 to 62-67.10.
Ky. REv. STAT. sees. 220.010 to 220.990,
CODE OF VA. sees. 62-68 to 62-94. "Id. at sec. 62-68 (1942).
See Ky. REv. STAT. sees. 182.010, 182.170 to 182.990, and 416.180.
CODE OF VA. sees. 62-95 to 62-106.
Ky. REv. STAT. 182.170 to 182.990.
"CODE OF VA. sec. 62-103 (1919) and Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 182.210 (1893).
'The majority of Ky. REV. STAT. sees. 182.170 to 182.990 were enacted in
1893. CODE OF VA. sees. 62-95 to 62-106 were enacted in 1919.
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dam were quite different from those facing a landowner today, but
nevertheless, the procedure to obtain permission to build a dam or
other structure remains unchanged from that time to this.
The problem of the regulation of ports, which is covered by the
provisions of Chapter 6.1 of the Virginia Code,32 is not of as great
importance in Kentucky as it is in Virginia, for Kentucky is not a sea-
board state. Nor does Kentucky need any extensive laws covering
erosion to beaches (Chapter 7.2 of the Code of Virginia); or harbor-
masters, dockmasters, and portwardens who will inspect ships and
prescribe the duties of the various ports (Chapter 9 of the Code of
Virginia); or to regulate vessels and their seamen (Chapter 11 of the
Code of Virginia); or aids to navigation, such as buoys or beacons
(Chapter 12 of the Code of Virginia). The matter of federal aid to
river, harbor, and flood control projects (Chapter 7.1 of the Code of
Virginia) might, however, offer opportunity for study in Kentucky.
38
Chapter 10 of the Code of Virginia is entitled "Wharves, Docks,
Piers and Bulkheads."8 4 In either Virginia or Kentucky an individual
may erect any of these structures on his own land provided he does
not obstruct navigation or injure the rights of others. Once the struc-
ture is erected, the court has the power to have it removed if it violates
the provisions of the statutes.35
Chapter 13 is devoted to preventing the removal of sand and gravel
which lies on the shore of a stream or lake within the state of Virginia
by one who does not own the land on which the sand or gravel is
found.36
The final chapter of the Virginia Code, Chapter 14, prohibits
"miscellaneous offenses," which it is in fact entitled. 37 It provides that
it shall be unlawful for any person to cast an article into a river so as
to injure the interests of another person,8 or build a dam or anything
which will obstruct navigation or the passage of fish, except when the
dam is allowed by law or order of the court.8 9 In 1954 the Virginia
legislature adopted an additional provision which authorizes certain
counties to enact ordinances prohibiting the casting of harmful articles
' CODE OF VA. secs. 62-106.1 to 62-106.12.
'For Kentucky statutes covering federal aid to flood control projects, see Ky.
REv. STAT. secs. 104.030, 104.190. Also see Ky. REv. STAT. secs. 182.040 to
182.110 concerning portwardens.
CODE OF VA. sees. 6-139 to 62-141.
'Ibid and Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 182.020 (1914).
CODE OF VA. secs. 62-178 to 62-181. ' Id. at sees. 62-182 to 69-194.
"Id. at see. 62-182 (1919) (wood and timber) and see. 62-183 (1919) (dead
animals, bait, etc.).
' Id. at see. 62-194 (1919) (in general) and secs. 62-185 to 62-191 (certain
designated counties and rivers).
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into waters.40 These provisions do indirectly affect a private land-
owner's right to use the water in a river or stream contiguous to his
land, and before a landowner can use the water as he wishes, he must
look to these statutes to see ff his act is prohibited under them. The
Kentucky Revised Statutes are covered in most of these problems,
although not in as great detail, in provisions which are not brought
together under one chapter as the Virginia legislature has done.41
In summary, although the Virginia legislation is called a Water
Code, it contains few if any provisions governing riparian rights which
the Kentucky legislature needs to adopt. The two principal riparian
provisions which appear in the Virginia Code but not in the Kentucky
statutes are, first, that land and water resources should both be ade-
quately protected and conserved, and second, that neither the rights,
contracts, nor obligations of counties, cities, and towns shall be
affected by the statutory declaration of riparian rights. If the Kentucky
legislature considered and adopted these two principles, the statutory
law of riparian rights as it now exists in Kentucky would not be
materially changed. In fact, the detailed provisions of the Kentucky
statutes give a clearer statutory declaration of the law of riparian rights
than does the Virginia Code. Also, the Kentucky statutes describe the
factual background giving rise to the legislation which serves to em-
phasize that the existing situation in Kentucky demands regulation for
the welfare of the people. The scope of the regulation of the statutes
is clearly stated by expressly declaring what waters will and will not
be subject to regulation. A riparian owner in Kentucky is given the
right of reasonable use of the water contiguous to his land, and the
statutes give a more detailed definition of the reasonable use theory.
Finally, the common law principle of domestic uses is clearly set out
in the statutes, and the landowner is encouraged to impound water
while it is at an excess in order to avoid later shortages of water which
might occur in time of drought. Of all of these provisions, the Virginia
Code merely adopts the reasonable use theory.
J. A NA GREGORY
' Id. at sec. 62-183.1 (1954).
"See Ky. REv. STAT. see. 438.060 (1893) (contamination of waterways) and
sec. 182.010 (1924) (obstructing navigation).
